Abstract-This paper proposes Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS), a construction for remote data storage that provides access-pattern obfuscation in a honest-but-curious adversarial model, while allowing for low bandwidth overhead and client storage. Compared to the state of the art, the main advantage of CAOS is that it supports concurrent access without a proxy, for multiple read-only clients and a single read-write client. Concurrent access is achieved by letting clients maintain independent maps that describe how the data is stored. These maps might diverge from client to client, but it is guaranteed that no client will ever lose track of current data. We achieve efficiency and concurrency at the expense of perfect obfuscation: in CAOS the extent to which access patterns are hidden is determined by the resources allocated to its built-in obfuscation mechanism. To assess this trade-off we provide both a security and a performance analysis of our protocol instance. We additionally provide a proofof-concept implementation 1 .
Introduction
Cloud computing is becoming an increasingly attractive solution for data storage. However cloud computing does not provide sufficient and reliable security for private and sensitive data. Even when encryption is used, malicious servers and operators can learn user access patterns and derive information based on them (e.g., data accessed more often can be assumed to be more important) [1] .
One cryptographic primitive specifically designed to hide access patterns is Oblivious RAM (ORAM). ORAM was first investigated by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [2, 3] for the purposes of preventing software reverse engineering by hiding a program's access patterns to memory. The issue has since become important in the context of cloud computing, where clients and data-store servers often reside in different trust domains and trust between them cannot always be established. Modern ORAM schemes [4, 5, 6, 7] are seen as viable options of addressing this problem. However, in real-life scenarios, even the best ORAMs can prove to be impractical [8] , mainly because of the high bandwidth requirements and/or client storage constraints. Another major limitation of modern ORAM constructions is that they are mainly restricted to having a single-client that connects to the data-store server. This is because data in the store is accessed through a client maintained local structure (i.e. map). Migrating from this model has proven difficult. Even small deviations, such as allowing multiple clients to access the store through a proxy that acts as the single-client [9, 10] have been shown to have vulnerabilities [11] . 1 Available: https://github.com/meehien/caos As ORAMs have been difficult to use in real-life, other more specialised, but also more efficient security primitives have been developed in the context of privacy preserving access to cloud-stored data i.e. searchable encryption (SE) schemes. SE schemes can use either symmetric keys [12, 13, 14] or public keys [15, 16] and allow clients to securely search cloud stored databases through precomputed ciphertexts called trapdoors. SE schemes have low computational requirements from clients and are bandwidth efficient. However, prior work has shown that searchable encryption schemes leak significant amounts of information about their encrypted indexes when using attacks which combine access-pattern analysis, background information about data stored, and language-based word frequency knowledge [17] . Incorporating changes and updates to the searched database is also a difficult process. Often schemes require the whole index to be regenerated for any the new information added [12, 13] . Finally, SE schemes are restricted to just searching databases. Actual data retrieval after the result of the search has been returned needs to happen through a private information retrieval (PIR) protocol [18] or an ORAM.
As such, an ideal system would have the general applicability and access-pattern privacy of ORAM (cloud storage which hides access patterns), and also the bandwidth efficiency and concurrent access capabilities that are similar to those of SE schemes. In this paper we take steps towards this by proposing a new design for a general-purposed secure storage with concurrency and bandwidth efficiency. However, the privacy guarantees we provide are not absolute. Instead, our protocol requires that users provision resources for accesspattern obfuscation, and the security guarantees depend on how much of these resources are available.
Contributions
This paper proposes Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS), a secure storage access protocol that can hide data access frequency and access patterns, while allowing for concurrent data access. Our main focus when designing CAOS was to obtain a bandwidth efficient protocol that supports concurrency by design and is able to provide a customizable and measurable amount of data and access-pattern privacy. Our main contributions are as follows: 1) Obfuscated access patterns. We propose a secure access protocol for remote data storage which is able to hide access patterns. Our construction requires at least one of each of the following two types of clients: a normal client which stores data, and an obfuscation client which hides the normal client's access patterns. Maximum privacy is achieved as long as at least one obfuscation client behaves honestly. 2) Concurrent access. We provide, to our knowledge, the first concurrent access protocol with access-pattern hiding properties that does not require a trusted third party (e.g. proxy). Our concurrent access protocol is limited to scenarios with multiple readers, but a single writer. 3) Small and constant bandwidth. For all clients with readwrite/read-only access, our protocol requires a constant bandwidth that is independent of the size of the store. This is possible because we separate the regular access clients and the security responsible clients (i.e. the obfuscation clients). The bandwidth requirements are also small. In our instantiation a single block of data requires a constant two blocks to be transferred. 4) Security and performance analysis. We give a gamebased definition of data and access-pattern privacy for CAOS protocols against honest-but-curious storage servers. Furthermore, we apply this new definition to our CAOS protocol and prove it secure. Last but not least we report on the theoretical and observed performance of our protocol thanks to our own proof-of-concept implementation.
Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS)
CAOS is a protocol for storing data securely by encrypting data contents and anonymizing access patterns which allows one to trade storage space and security for concurrency and bandwidth efficiency.
Data elements. Let us first introduce the data elements of CAOS: blocks, positions and client stored maps. In CAOS data is partitioned into blocks of equal size. Each block of data is uniquely identified by a client using a block id (bid). Storing a block remotely involves encrypting the contents of the block and then placing the resulting ciphertext at a random location in the store's memory. We refer to these locations from the store's memory as positions. The size of the store is measured in the number of positions it has available for storing blocks. Clients can store the same block at multiple positions and keep track of were their data is located by maintaining a map which links block ids to positions.
Clients. There are two types of clients in CAOS: regular, readwrite or read-only clients and obfuscation clients. Both types of clients access the store directly and independently from each other, using the same client-server protocol. Normal clients are the main users of the store. They have low bandwidth requirements, and low local storage requirements as they only have to store a map. However, accesses done by these clients does leak information about access patterns.
Obfuscation clients (OCs) are the clients that provide security. OCs are able to provide access-pattern obfuscation for themselves as well as other clients (e.g. regular clients) through the use of a buffer which is stored locally in addition to the map. The size of the local buffer and the bandwidth are proportional to the speed of obfuscation. Access-pattern obfuscation. We begin reasoning about accesspattern obfuscation form the ORAM definitions for accesspattern security [19] . Intuitively, these require that no information should leak with regards to: (1) which data is being accessed, (2) the frequency of accesses, (3) the relation between accesses, (4) the type of access, read or write, and (5) the age of data. ORAM constructions maintain invariants to ensure that no information is leaked regardless of how many times the store is accessed. CAOS maintains the requirement that no information is leaked for cases (1)-(5), but does not provide security guarantees for each individual access operation. Instead, CAOS provides security guarantees for store access sequences that involve both regular clients and OCs. The security definitions for content and access-pattern security in CAOS are detailed in Section 5. Concurrency. CAOS requires that multiple clients access the store simultaneously and independently from one another such that: the regular clients can use the store, the OCs can provide access-pattern obfuscation, and any individual client's access to the store is not affected by any other client's availability.
However, achieving concurrency in CAOS is not a trivial task. This is because each client access operation randomly changes the contents of store, and these changes are only stored locally, in the map of the client that performed the access operation. Thus, CAOS needs to address the following two problems: (1) how to synchronise locally stored client maps in an efficient manner, and (2) how to allow multiple clients to simultaneously change the store in a way that does not result in data loss for other clients. Scheme definitions. In the following we draw on the above and give the syntax for a CAOS protocol. Definition 1. An (n, N ) store S is a collection of n data blocks written to N store positions such that n < N .
Definition 2.
A CAOS scheme O = (KGen, INIT.STORE, INIT.OC, ACCESSRW, ACCESSOC) over an (n, N ) store S is a tuple of five polynomial-time algorithms such that:
: is a probabilistic key generation algorithm run by the client to set up the scheme. It takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a secret key k. S ← INIT.STORE(DB, N, k) : is a deterministic algorithm run by the client to initialize the CAOS store. It takes as input a database DB = (B 0 , . . . , B n−1 ) of n data blocks, encrypts them under key k, and distributes them between the total number N of store positions. buf, S ← INIT.OC(S, k) : is a deterministic algorithm run by the obfuscation client to initialize itself. It requires access to a CAOS store S and its encryption key k and creates the internal buffer of the obfuscation client. ret, S ← ACCESSRW(B, op, d, S, k) : is a probabilistic algorithm run by the client(s) to access a store. It takes as input the bid B to be accessed, the operation op ∈ {read, write}, the data d to be written if op = write, and the store S and its key k. When the client runs this algorithm, some positions on the server are read, and others are written. It returns the block read or an acknowledgement for the write operation, and the new state of the store S. buf, S ← ACCESSOC(buf, S, k) : is a probabilistic algorithm run by the obfuscation client to access a store. It takes as input a local data structure buf that acts as a buffer, a store S and a key k. The algorithm alters the locally stored buffer of the obfuscation client. Additionally, when the obfuscation client runs this algorithm, some positions in the store are read, while others are written. This changes the mapping between blocks and positions.
CAOS use-case example
Alice wishes to move her 1TB encrypted email store in the cloud, for easy access from her three devices: a work computer, a laptop and a mobile device. She also requires that her devices have simultaneously access and access-pattern protection.
One option for Alice is to use an ORAM scheme [4, 5, 6, 7] as they provide both data encryption and access pattern security with O(log N ) efficiency. With ORAM, Alice can expect to download and upload an average of about 468KB of data 2 for each 30KB email message she wants to access.
To enable simultaneous access for her devices she can use a proxy-based ORAM scheme [10, 11] . This would allow Alice's devices to use less bandwidth, because they would interact with the proxy, however, the bandwidth between the proxy and the store will remain similar (i.e. [10] requires 30MB/s to provide 1MB/s access to the store, [11] requires a transfer of 256KB to access a 4KB store block). Unfortunately, the high bandwidth and computational requirements might force Alice to place the proxy in the cloud, an option she does not like because then access patterns to the proxy would leak information.
An alternative option for Alice would be to use CAOS. In CAOS her devices would have simultaneous and direct access to the store. Access-pattern obfuscation would be done by OCs which can be placed either in the cloud or on the premises because they access the store independently from her devices. However, access operations in CAOS randomize the store, and Alice's devices and OCs would require some form of synchronisation between them to be able to access it.
One naïve CAOS implementation which solves the synchronisation problem is to separate a part of the store, share it between devices and OCs, and use it to log the changes. During each access, clients would be able to process the log and update their access information (i.e. maps). However, if Alice were to stop using any one of her 3 device for just a month, upon resuming use, that device will have to process around 46MB worth of log entries 3 only to access a 30KB index, as the log grows linearly with the number of accesses. Security would also be affected. At the very least the variable network traffic required to retrieve the log reveals the period when the device was offline.
In the following, we describe our instantiation of the CAOS protocol which addresses previous concerns. Let us anticipate that we achieve anonymization for data access patterns to the encrypted remote store by using a combination of: uniformly partitioning data into blocks; redundantly storing the blocks in several locations and shuffling data with every OC access.
Efficient concurrency in CAOS (for single writer)
This section describe our CAOS construction O. We begin with an overview of the scheme and we will follow up with details about our implementation and algorithms. The complete source-code is available at [20] 
Overview
In Section 2 we stated that the goal of CAOS is to achieve measurable access-pattern obfuscation and concurrency. In the following we will be providing a high level overview about how these are achieved in O.
Access pattern obfuscation. In O we achieve access-pattern obfuscation for sequences of access operations (see Section 5) . We would like to remind the reader that is different than the access-pattern security for each individual access operation which is used in other works [2, 3, 19] . We present our methods to achieve this in the following.
Hiding the type of access and the age of the data, is done by joining both the read and the write operations into a single access function, ACCESSRW. This prevents the adversary from learning when data is read or written, and when new data is added to the store, with the exception of the initial provisioning of the store.
In O blocks are read and written from/to random positions. Our scheme uses a locally stored map to keep track between which store positions contain which blocks. Additionally, the size of the store has to be larger than the size of the data to be stored. This allows ACCESSRW to create redundancies for accessed blocks by re-encrypting and duplicating blocks read from the store onto new random free-positions. In O we use the term free-positions to refer both to positions which have never been written, and to positions which belong to blocks that have at least one redundancy (i.e. blocks that have been accessed before and are stored in two or more places). By allowing clients to access same data from multiple sources we are able to partially obfuscate details about the frequency with which specific data is being accessed, and about the relationship between subsequent accesses. We say partially because, even though data is duplicated to random positions, the adversary can still connect these positions to the initial position from where the duplication process began. To address this issue we use obfuscation clients (OCs). The OCs are readonly clients that use the ACCESSOC function to access the store similarly to regular clients. The difference to regular clients is that OCs maintain a local buffer which is used to store the contents of the positions received from the store. Thus, when an OC performs an access, it is able to write back (i.e. duplicate) a block from the local buffer rather than the block read from the position accessed. As such, blocks that are duplicated by OCs are not linked to any other blocks and do not leak any access-pattern information. We detail the security provided by our OC shuffling method in Section 5, and we provide a performance analysis in Section 6.
Data structures. Before we discuss concurrency let us introduce the data structures used by O (see Fig 1a and Fig  1b) . In our CAOS scheme each block contains the following: data to be stored block.data, a block identifier block.bid, a consolidation field block.cns that indicates the number of clients that know that a block is stored at a position, and a timestamp block.ts of when the data was last changed. Client local maps are indexed by the block identifier bid, and contain the following: bid.psns this enumerates the positions in the store from which the block bid is available, bid.ts stores most up-to-date timestamp observed, and bid.vf stores positions p observed by the map holder (i.e. client) to have block.cns=|Clients|, where Clients is the set of all clients engaged in our protocol. In the following we detail on concurrency.
Concurrency. In O access-pattern obfuscation is achieved through shuffling, thus achieving efficient concurrency with direct access for all clients represents a significant challenge. This is especially difficult because in O each client maintains its own map and syncs it with the store independently from other clients during ACCESSRW or ACCESSOC operations. In order to prevent data loss we ensure that "for each data block, exists a valid position that is known to all clients". Maintaining this invariant has lead to two design constraints: (1) we require that for each single block accessed two positions are read and two positions are written on the server store, and (2) we restrict O to a single read-write (RW) client that works concurrently with other read-only (RO) clients and OCs. We detail on these restrictions in Section 5.3.
Shared knowledge between clients is tracked using block.cns and bid.vf. All clients start from the same version of the map, which is afterwards maintained independently by each one. The protocol requires clients to signal each other when they perform changes to their local maps (i.e. when reassigning a position or when changing the data in a block). Because the client only has access to one position per block during an access operation, the change produced by the client will be localised to that particular position in the store. The problem is that without any additional signalling other clients who are not aware of the change have no way of assessing whether the block stored at a specific position is the correct one (as indicated by their map). We indicate shared knowledge about a position as follows.
Whenever a client makes a change to a block, like modify the position where it is stored or update the block's data, the value block.cns is set to 1, meaning that only one client, the one that made the change is currently aware of the change.
When other clients access this block they can become aware that a reassignment has taken place by comparing the block.bid value stored in the block with the value they were expecting according to their local map. If the values do not match the client will infer that the position used to retrieve the block has been reassigned, and will update their local map accordingly. Similarly, by comparing timestamp data from the local map map [bid] .ts and from the retrieved block block.ts clients can determine if the block's data was updated. The complete algorithm is detailed in Section 3.2.2.
Once a client becomes aware that a block has been reassigned to a new position p (and has performed changes in its local map) it increments block.cns by 1 to signal clients that it is aware of the change. When the block.cns value is equal to the number of clients then all the clients can safely assume they have the same view about what block is stored at position p. We prove our synchronisation operation is correct and does not result in data loss in Section 5.3.
In the following we continue with detailed explanation of our algorithms.
Read-write (and read-only) client access
In O, each block, is stored on multiple positions. Each client in turn independently maintains a map which links block ids with positions. In this section we will explain how access to the store is performed, and how clients maintain these links without a separate synchronisation protocol. Read-write (RW) clients (e.g. email SMTP servers), and read-only (RO) clients (e.g. email readers), perform both reading and writing through the ACCESSRW function (Fig 2) , while OCs use the ACCESSOC function. In this section we present in detail the specific particularities and design choices of the ACCESSRW function. The the ACCESSOC function is detailed in Section 3.3. We introduce the main function first with calls to several sub-functions that implement required functionality. Each sub-function is subsequently described. The main ACCESSRW function detailed in Algorithm 1 involves the following 8 main steps:
• Select positions (line 2,3). First, select a position (line 2) to read/write a block as indicated by the input value bid (see Section 3.2.1). Then select a random position to sync to the local map (line 3). The block requested via bid will also be copied to the random position if necessary conditions are met (see Section 3.2.4).
• Read positions from store (line 4). Retrieve the block indicated by bid and the random block using previously selected positions and decrypt them using the key k.
• Sync (lines 5, 6) . Synchronize the metadata from the blocks retrieved with the local client map (see Section 3.2.2).
• Return read data (lines 7-9). Prepare to return data if the operation is READ and the block retrieved is correct. If the block retrieved has a different bid than the one requested the client has to re-run ACCESSRW. The protocol guarantees that every client has a valid position for every block (see Section 5.3).
• Replace block data (lines 10, 11) . If the operation is W RIT E replace the current data in req blk with the input data data. Complete function is detailed in Section 3.2.3.
• Duplicate block (line 12). Attempt to shuffle store data by coping the req blk to position cpy p, thus increasing the number of positions for req blk and reducing the available positions for block cpy blk (see Section 3.2.4).
• Write blocks to store (line 13). Encrypt req blk and cpy blk and write them at positions req p and cpy p.
• Return (line 14). Return out as requested data if op = READ and operation was successful and null otherwise. Return input data as out if op = W RIT E and operation was successful (null otherwise). ACCESSRW modifies the local map map and the store S.
SelectPosition function
Algorithm 2: Read a block from the store. The SelectP osition function (see Algorithm 2) interacts with the locally stored map data structure and selects a random position for a given block id bid. If no bid is supplied a completely random position is chosen from the set of known store positions.
Sync function
The Sync function (see Algorithm 3) enables CAOS clients to work concurrently, without having to synchronize their maps to access the store. We do require that once, during the setup phase, clients share the store key and a map from one of the other participating clients. Once a copy of the map has been obtained each client can maintain its own version of the map i.e. map c . Intuitively this works as follows: after a block has been retrieved from the store, the client needs to establish if local knowledge about the block is correct, i.e. bid of the retrieved block and the position used to retrieve it are correctly linked, and the time-stamp of the block is not older then the timestamp stored locally. As such, the block can be in multiple states of which only the following require a map modification: (1) old data -the block is marked as free; (2) wrong position, data up-to-date -update bid/position association; (3) new data -update bid/position association and local time-stamp.
Old data (and new data) in a block is detected by comparing the block.ts value with the locally stored map c [block.bid].ts value were block.bid is the bid of the block being synchronised. Old data are thus easy to detect as each bid entry from the map has a single time stamp (i.e. map c [block.bid].ts): the newest time stamp observed over all store accesses. In this case the position used to retrieve the block can be used for writing or duplication.
If a wrong position is detected then map c is updated with correct bid-position association (position thought to point to the requested bid is moved to the correct map c [block.bid].psns).
If new data is detected the local time-stamp is updated and positions pointing to old version of the block are removed from map c [block.bid].psns and map c [block.bid].vf. They can be reused for writing or duplication.
Any modification to a client's local map is communicated to other by incrementing block.cns. Writing a block to a CAOS store (same as reading from a CAOS store) in not guaranteed to succeed. The PrepareWrite function ensures that all conditions are met before overwriting the data of a block. A block can only be replaced if the id of the block requested matches the id of the block fetched.
PrepareWrite function
In the event that the block fetched is different then the block requested data can still be replaced but only if the data in the fetched block was old.
Replacement of data inside the block is indicated to other clients by resetting the block.cns value to 1 (i.e. only the current client knows about it) and updating the block.ts to current epoch time. Algorithm 4 presents the PrepareWrite function in detail. As previously mentioned, in the CAOS protocol, data shuffling is performed through duplication with the purpose of increasing the number of available positions for blocks accessed more often and reducing the available positions for the less accessed blocks.
DuplicateBlock
The DuplicateBlock operation performs the necessary checks and attempts to reassign positions from one block to another while ensuring that clients still have at least one position for each block. The difficulty of this operation resides in the fact that each client has a slightly different version of the map and can only become aware of changes after they have happened (often with significant delay).
In order to allow clients to attain a shared view about a position we require that positions do not get reassigned while their block.cns value is below the maximum number of clients. The single exception to this rule is when a client has reassigned a position, decides to reassign it again and no other client has noticed the reassignment. This is allowed because it will not affect the convergence time for that position. The specific workings are presented in Algorithm 5
Obfuscation client access
In CAOS data shuffling is performed on a single position at a time. This process leaks a lot of information to the store server because every run of the ACCESSRW function links two positions together with a very hight probability (i.e. ideally, we require that the DuplicateBlock function is successful every time).
To mitigate this we use a separate obfuscation client access function ACCESSOC as presented in Algorithm 6. The ACCESSOC function is identical to the ACCESSRW function as far as the interaction with the store is concerned: two block are read from two server positions and two blocks are written to the same positions.
The purpose of the OC is to prevent the store from linking the positions that are duplicated thorough the regular ACCESSRW function. This is done through the use of a locally stored buffer. When ACCESSOC is used to interact with the store, the blocks read are placed into a local buffer and random blocks from previous sessions, currently stored in the buffer, are written back to store. The replacement procedure is bound to the same constraints as when blocks are duplicated by regular clients so we use the same DuplicateBlock functionality to ensure these are enforced (see Section 3.2.4). We show in sections 5 and 6 that this method is secure in breaking links between read and written positions. A detailed version of our method is presented in Algorithm 7. 
Concurrency and parallel access in O
In O concurrency is supported by design. Clients communicate with the store using only two messages as shown previously. We abstract them here for simplicity to: READ(p 1 , p 2 ) and W RIT E(p 1 , p 2 ). The READ(p 1 , p 2 ) is the message used to request the two blocks located at positions p 1 and p 2 in the store. Upon receiving this message the server will lock p 1 and p 2 and will return the blocks to the client. The client will process the data, and will use the metadata to update its local map, as described in Section 3. While the client processes the contents of the blocks the server will keep p 1 and p 2 locked. The positions p 1 and p 2 are unlocked when the server receives a W RIT E(p 1 , p 2 ) message from the client that locked the positions. In the event the client is unable to send the W RIT E(p 1 , p 2 ) message a timeout period is used to unlock them.
Recall that the client is interested in retrieving the content of only one of the positions, p 1 , where p 1 is chosen randomly from the set of positions associated to a given block id in the client's local map. The other position p 2 is chosen from the store at random and is used to duplicate the data from p 1 . As such, a second client can request the same block using different positions. In the event that the second client requests the same positions p 1 and/or p 2 , during the time they are locked, the RW OC Store
Fig. 4: Concurrent access in CAOS. Upon receiving a
READ(p1, p2) message the server locks requested positions p1 and p2. If receiving a second request for p1 and/or p2, from a different client (e.g. the OC), the server will reply with an error. The second client can restart the protocol and request a new pair (e.g. p 1 and p 2 ). Positions are unlocked after the server processes the respective W RIT E position message (e.g. W RIT E(p1, p2) or W RIT E(p 1 , p 2 )).
server will inform the client of the lockout through an error message. By running ACCESSRW again, the second client can select new positions p 1 and p 2 to retrieve the requested block and a duplicate-destination block. A detailed instantiation of the protocol is presented in Fig 4. One a secondary benefit from supporting concurrency is that it can also be allow parallel access to the store. Because each CAOS access only affects two positions at a time, clients (and OCs) can instantiate multiple ACCESSRW (or ACCESSOC) operations simultaneously for different blocks. This increases access speeds when the data required is stored in multiple blocks. It also affects the speed of the obfuscation process which can be increased or decreased by adjusting the bandwidth available.
Content and Access-Pattern Privacy for CAOS and Protocol Correctness
In this section we give a formal definition for the content privacy and pattern access privacy of Obfuscated RAM protocols. Next we analyse the privacy offered by our CAOS instance O. Finally, we present our invariants which ensure that our asynchronous concurrency protocol does not result in unintentional data loss. is the tuple AP i = (p r1 , . . . , p r l , p w1 , . . . , p wm ), consisting of the l positions read by the server and the m positions written by the server. The access-pattern induced by a sequence of queries is the combination of the patterns induced by the individual queries.
Game-based privacy for CAOS
Attacker Model. When the queries ACCESSRW and ACCESSOC are run, the adversary learns the access-pattern induced by those queries. The attacker is given access to the algorithms INIT.STORE and INIT.OC, and thus knows the initial layout of the store and OC buffer.
Using the access-pattern definition above we define the security of a generic CAOS construction O against a multiple query attacker in the following.
Definition 4 (data and access-pattern privacy). CAOS data and access-pattern privacy is defined through a multiple query security experiment as follows (see also Fig 5) . Let O = (KGen, INIT.STORE, INIT.OC, ACCESSRW, ACCESSOC) be a CAOS scheme over an (n, N ) store S, λ a security parameter, r be number of rounds the OC client is run, and b ∈ {0, 1}. Let A = (A 1,1 , . . . , A 1,q , A 2 ) be a q-query adversary. Let DB be a database. We consider Exp Let us argue that the security experiment above captures both content and access-pattern privacy for CAOS protocols. Data privacy against the server is captured by letting the adversary choose two equal-sized data blocks B 0 and B 1 (indexed by their block id's) before every ACCESSRW query. The read-write (read-only) client will call ACCESSRW on data block B b , where b ∈ {0, 1} is unknown to the adversary. On the other hand, access-pattern privacy against the server is captured by an adversarial choosing of the operation to be performed, i.e. either op 0 or op 1 , depending on the value of b that is unknown to the adversary. During the experiment, the adversary A has full knowledge of the instructions run and the changes occurred in the store when the read-only (readwrite) and obfuscation clients will be calling the algorithms ACCESSRW, ACCESSOC as defined by the corresponding CAOS protocol O. The attacker's advantage as defined above measures how well the adversary does in gaining knowledge on b by querying ACCESSRW, ACCESSOC a number j of times.
Analysis of O content and access-pattern privacy
Our aim now is to analyze privacy offered by our protocol O against a multiple query adversary. To this end, we need to make use of two lemmas, starting with the following lemma. Lemma 1. Let S be the (n, N ) CAOS store with N = {p 0 , . . . , p N −1 } positions. With the O protocol, suppose that our ACCESSOC is run r times. Let no(p i ) be the event that the position p i was not overwritten during the r rounds. The probability that, after r runs of the ACCESSOC method, at least one of the N positions has not been overwritten (i.e. at least one position survived being overwritten) is:
In order to increase its advantage in the privacy game, the adversary uses as leverage its knowledge of what blocks are in which positions in the store, and what blocks are in the OC buffer. As OC runs, the adversary might try to track the movement of blocks. We can model the adversary's knowledge of what is inside the OC buffer as a probability distribution.
Suppose the buffer size is s. The OC buffer contains at most one occurrence of a given block id. Our goal in the following is to describe the evolution of the adversary's knowledge as a probability distribution. We start by recalling that, at each step, OC selects a block to be added to the buffer. If the selected block id is already in the buffer, then the set of block ids in the buffer is not changed. But if the selected block is not currently in the buffer, then one of the buffer's slots is chosen (with uniform probability) and the block id in that slot is evicted, in order to add the selected one. Therefore, the buffer contents will be X after such a step if:
1) The buffer contents were already X, and an element in X was selected; or 2) For some x ∈ X and e ∈ X, the buffer contents was (X − {x}) ∪ {e}, and x got selected for adding to the buffer, and e was chosen for eviction from the buffer and gets put back in the store where x had been. We view this as a system of states and transitions. A state is the pair (X, sel), where X is a set of block ids, and sel is a function from block ids to reals that abstracts the store. The value sel(x) is the probability that a position in the store chosen uniformly at random contains block id x. Since x must occur at least once in the store, and since every other block must also occur at least once, x appears at least once and at most N − n + 1 times. Therefore, for any x, the value sel(x) is in the set { }. There are two kinds of transition, corresponding to the two points above: 1) For each x ∈ X: (X, sel) can transition to (X, sel), with probability sel(x). 2) For each x ∈ X and e ∈ X:
((X − {x}) ∪ {e}), sel Let us write inb j (X) for the probability that, after the jth run, the set of block ids present in the buffer is X. We can state the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let out j (B) be the probability that the block coming out of an OC with buffer size s at the j-th step is the block B. For all j, j > r and initial distributions inb 0 , the probability |out j (B) − out j (B)| is at most
for some constant C and λ 2 < 1, and is therefore negligible in r.
Proof. Let P be the transition matrix for this Markov chain. Then P is stochastic, irreducible and aperiodic. Let π j be the probability distribution after j steps. Then π j = π 0 · P j . Let λ 1 and λ 2 be the largest and second-largest eigenvalues of P . Overwhelmingly likely, the enginvalues are all distinct. Since P is stochastic, λ 1 = 1 and |λ 2 | < 1. Applying the PerronFrobenius Theorem similarly to Backaker [21, Theorem 3 and Example 1], we have P r = P ∞ + O(|λ 2 | r ), and therefore π j − π j = π 0 · C |λ 2 | r for j, j > r for some constant C . Let π(X, sel) be the probability that the state is (X, sel) in the probability distribution π.
Notice that out j (B) = X|B∈X inb j (X). Therefore,
Theorem 1. O has content and access-pattern privacy, i.e. the advantage of any multiple query adversary against the privacy of O is negligible in the security parameter λ and the number of OC rounds r.
Proof. We bound the distinguishing advantage of any CAOS adversary through the following sequence of "game hops". Game 1. This is the legitimate Exp 0 m,A (O) experiment. In particular, in the j-th challenge query C returns
We define the following series of experiments for j = 1, . . . , q.
Game 2, j. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , q} be fixed. In this experiment, the queries i = 1, . . . for j = 1, . . . , q is upper-bounded by the distinguishing advantage against the semantic security of the encryption scheme, which is negligible [22] . Trivially Exp
Next, for j = 1, . . . , q we define a new sequence of experiments.
Game 3, j. Fix j. In this experiment, the queries i = 1, . . . , j are answered with ACCESSRW (B 1,i , op 0,i , d 1,i , S, k) , i.e. by running operation op 0,i on block B 1,i with data d 1,i (instead of running it on block B 0,i ). The remaining queries until the q-th query remain unchanged, i.e. they return ACCESSRW(B 0,i , op 0,i , d 1,i , S, k) for i = j + 1, . . . , q. Let us call resulting experiment Exp
3,j m,A (O).
We proceed to upper bound the probability that an adversary has in distinguishing access to two different blocks B 2,j and
Consider the r runs of OC. Let r 1 = r/2; we will distinguish between the first set of r 1 runs, and the remaining r − r 1 runs. Now we distinguish between two situations that arise after the runs: State A The adversary has observed that all the positions in the store got overwritten by a block id coming out of OC during the second set of r − r 1 runs. State B The adversary has observed that not all the positions got overwritten; that is, at least one position survived being overwritten during the second set of r − r 1 runs. When a store position is overwritten at step j by a block coming from OC, the adversary's probability distribution of what block is in that store position is out j (·). If State A is observed, then the adversary's probability of distinguishing the block read in ACCESSRW is at most r . The probability that state B is observed is p N,r1 (this notation is defined in Lemma 1).
The probability of distinguishing is the probability of arriving in state A times the probability of distinguishing in state A, plus the probability of arriving in state B times the probability of distinguishing in state B. This is at most:
Since both S r and p N,r are negligible in r, the probability and therefore the advantage of the adversary is negligible in r.
Let us define the last series of game hops, again for j = 1, . . . , q. 
Invariants in O
Different clients hold different position maps, and therefore it is possible that a client's position map will be out of date. Being a little bit out of date is not a problem: if a client seeks a block at a position and finds a different block there, the client can detect that, and seek the block at another position. However, we need to be sure that a client will always eventually find the block. We therefore prove the following invariant: for every client and every block, the client has a valid position for the block in its map (INV-2 below) .
In the following we will use block[p] notation to denote the block contained at position p in the server store, and map C [B] to denote the entry for block id B in the map of client C.
We start with a simpler invariant, which is a useful lemma. a) INV-1.: The variable block [p] .cns on the server is at most equal to the number of clients that know that that block is at position p. More precisely: for all positions p,
The code maintains this invariant by linking any change to the local map with an operation on the block[p].cns value. These changes happen when the contents of the block is updated or deleted (by marking the block as free). The SyncPositons operation (see section 3. More precisely, for any block id B, there is a position p such that
Before we prove this invariant, we provide some intuition. To maintain INV-2, we use the map [B] .vf set stored in the client's map. This set tracks which are the positions p of a block that a client has observed to have a maximum value for block [p] .cns. In order to prevent data loss, we require that (1) at any time each client can only reassign a single position, and (2) that at least one position still remains if all the clients decide to reassign one position.
The second part of the requirement (2) is easily achieved by checking that the size of map [B] .vf is bigger than the number of clients. We address the first requirement (1) by requiring each client mark the map [B] .vf set as empty whenever they reassign a position from it. This will prevent the client to reassign any consolidated positions until it re-learns their location.
Proof. We prove it for the case that there are two clients, say C and D; as will be seen, the proof generalises intuitively to more clients. Suppose INV-2 is not an invariant; then there is a transition from a state st 3 in which INV-2 holds for a block id B, to a state st 4 in which it does not hold for B. Suppose client C reallocates the crucial position p in st 3 which is lost in st 4 
Performance analysis
The security of CAOS derives from the fact that the obfuscation client runs in between the accesses made by the readwrite (read-only) client(s). Intuitively, the more runs of OC, the more secure the system. In this section, we derive the expected number of rounds of OC needed to get perfect security (i.e. a situation in which the adversary has no knowledge of what block is in what position). In our algorithm, OC processes two positions per round. For simplicity, in this section, we consider an OC that processes a single position per round. Intuitively, the performance of the two-round OC is no worse than a one-round OC.
Theorem 2. The expected number of rounds of OC needed to obtain perfect privacy for a (n, N ) store is at most 2 + s + (n − s) log(n − s) + N log N , where s is the OC's buffer size.
Since N is much greater than n and s, this is dominated by N log N . Intuitively, perfect privacy cannot be achieved with less than N rounds, since every store position needs to be updated. The OBS shuffle (a) consists of two moves: mv1, which moves a random card from partition U into a random location of partition V; and mv2, which moves a random card from partition V into the vacated place of partition U. In the OBS (b) shuffle mv 1 moves the top card in U into a random location of V; and mv 2 which moves the top card in V into the bottom place of U.
Proof. The number of rounds of OC needed is the sum of:
1) The number r 1 of rounds needed for the buffer contents to be randomised (this is needed only the first time OC is run, when the adversary knows the contents of the buffer); 2) The number r 2 of rounds needed for every position in the store to have been overwritten by the buffer.
To calculate r 1 , consider an array of size n containing all the blocks. Let U be the subarray containing the first s blocks of the array (these represent the contents of the OC buffer), and V the remaining n − s blocks (representing those that are not in the buffer). In each round of OC, a random block B from U is selected and moved to V (this corresponds to evicting a block from the buffer), while a random block from V is moved to the former place of B in U . We seek the expected number r 1 of runs which completely randomises the array. This situation is similar to shuffling a deck of n cards, using a "top-to-random" shuffle, a well studied method [23, 24, 25] . In a top-to-random shuffle one repeatedly takes the top card of the deck and inserts it into a random position. In the following we will argue that our shuffle, OBS (Fig 6a) , is no worse than a "top-to-random" shuffle.
In OBS the deck is partitioned into U and V . It takes a random card from U and inserts it randomly in V , and takes a random card of V and inserts it into the place vacated in U . Intuitively, this is no worse than the shuffle OBS which simply takes a random card in U and inserts it in V , and takes the top card in V and inserts it at the bottom of U . Now consider the shuffle OBS (Fig 6b) which is like OBS but instead of taking a random card in U , we take the top card in U . Again, OBS is no worse than OBS , and therefore OBS is no worse that OBS .
To calculate the expected number of rounds of OBS needed, we proceed similarly to [23] . Consider the bottom card of the deck. One has to wait on average n − s rounds before a card is inserted below it. Then one has to wait (n − s)/2 more rounds before a card is again inserted below the original bottom card. Continuing in this way, the number of rounds needed for the original bottom to get to the U/V threshold is
with n = 10 6 Store capacity n · |block| 64 GB Server storage C · n · |block|, 128 GB requirements A further s rounds are needed for the original bottom to progress from the U/V threshold to the top of the deck. Thus, the total number of rounds is (n − s) log(n − s) + s. Since OBS is no worse than OBS , we have
Calculation of r 2 is similar. The first of the N positions is overwritten in one round. For the second position to be overwritten, we have to wait N/(N − 1) rounds; this is a bit longer, because we may accidentally overwrite the first one again. The ith position requires us to wait N/(N − i) rounds. Thus, all the positions are overwritten after an expected
rounds. Therefore, r 1 + r 2 ≤ 2 + (n − s) log(n − s) + s + N log N .
Implementation
In this section we report on the performance of our instantiation of CAOS in terms of storage and bandwidth, and present measured data from a non-optimized implementation of our protocol [20] for a 64GiB store size. Read-write client. Client storage in CAOS is limited to the client map. The clients do not require any form of buffer to be stored locally, as each ACCESSRW involves fetching two blocks from the store, re-encrypting them, and finally writing them back. In our CAOS instantiation O bandwidth requirements are constant: two blocks are accessed for each requested data block from the store. Because the storage server only locks the positions requested for the duration of a client access, multiple blocks can be requested simultaneously in a parallel manner.
Obfuscation client. The OC accesses the store the same way the RW client does, hence the bandwidth requirements per block are the same. The OC requires additional storage than the read-write client in the form of a local buffer which is needed for the obfuscation process. In Section 6 we show how to compute r 1 the number of rounds required to obtain secure output from the OC for any given buffer size s. We note that the rate given by Eq. 5 is valid for a single positions processed per round. Given that the OC behaves identical to the read-write client implies that the rate is in fact doubled.
Similarly, one can also compute an upper bound on the number of rounds needed to bring the store from a completely insecure state (i.e. adversary knows the contents of each position) to a secure state using Eq. 6.
Storage server. In order for our CAOS protocol to guarantee that blocks can be shuffled between positions it is required that each block is stored redundantly on a number of positions equal to the number of clients using CAOS. However, if the additional space is not available when the store is initialised, our protocol will automatically adjust itself allowing the size of the store to be increased gradually.
Implementation. We have implemented O in C++ using the OpenSSL-1.0.2.k for the encryption operations (concretely we use AES-128 in CBC mode) and Protocol Buffers 4 for network message serialisation. Our setup consists of a server which exposes a block-store API with direct access to disk. The server's API is addressable through positions. In addition to the server we implemented a RW client and an OC client which are able to run ACCESSRW and ACCESSOC respectively.
On an Intel i5-3570 CPU at 3.40GHz running ArchLinux we have instantiated a secure store of 64GiB with a redundancy factor C = 2 (i.e. every block is stored on two positions resulting in N = 2n). We measured the read/write speed to the store, client storage and server storage. Our results are presented in Table I .
Related Work
To our knowledge, there is no existing work that uses an obfuscation client to hide access patterns. However several works have been influential in the development of CAOS.
Oblivious RAM (ORAM). Since the initial proposal of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [2, 3] , work on ORAM has been mainly focused on addressing access-pattern privacy related issues in cloud storage [4, 10, 26, 6, 9, 11] . However, in spite significant progress, ORAMs still have considerable bandwidth requirements which usually makes them impractical for real life applications [8] . The map data structure used to track where blocks are stored has also restricted applications of ORAM to scenarios that mostly involve a single-client accessing a server, although asynchronous schemes have been proposed [10] . TaoStore [11] was the first to to introduce a formal study about asynchronicity in ORAM systems, and a scheme called 4 https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers Tree-based Asynchronous Oblivious Store (TaoStore) which was proven secure under this asynchronous access model. CAOS uses concepts from ORAMs, such as the generic block storage, and the client stored maps which track where blocks are stored on the remote server. However, CAOS uses a different security model than ORAM, achieves better bandwidth efficiency (i.e. O(1) for the RW/RO class of clients), and uses maps together with a synchronisation protocol which enables concurrent client access to the store.
Searchable Encryption (SE). Searchable encryption is a related field with the main focus of providing access-pattern privacy when accessing a search index stored in the cloud [27] . SE schemes aim to off-load as much client computation as possible to the remote server. CAOS has adopted this principle and offloads the heavy computation that would otherwise be performed by RW/RO clients to OCs. SE schemes usually use deterministic trapdoors perform searches on fixed indexes which are usually difficult to regenerate [12, 13] . Once a search has been completed SE schemes require may require an additional PIR protocol to access data. This is why ORAM is sometimes proposed as a solution for enabling secure cloud search [28, 29] . As a general purpose data storage protocol, ORAM can store search indexes and facilitate access to them (although not as efficiently as a SE scheme would) and also provide secure information retrieval.
CAOS is also general purpose storage protocol which can encode a search index as store blocks. Using CAOS as a storage for an encrypted search index can provide several advantages over both ORAM and standard SE schemes such as: similar bandwidth efficiency to SE schemes, non-deterministic trapdoors assuming that CAOS position identifiers are used as trapdoors, cheap and secure extensions to the search index, and the ability to be used as a PIR protocol.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed Concurrent-Access Obfuscated Store (CAOS), a secure cloud storage solution that is able to provide access-pattern obfuscation. We have presented our concurrent access protocol that allows multiple read-only clients to simultaneously access a CAOS store. We have proved that the concurrent access does not result in data loss. We have also proven the security of our protocol for any buffer size s used by the OC given a sufficient numbers of rounds r. Finally, we have shown that security provided by the CAOS protocol is proportional to the resources provisioned for access-pattern obfuscation, namely the buffer size s and the number of rounds r.
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